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Thicker Than Water:        
America’s Addiction to Cheap 
Flood Insurance 
 
By Jeffrey Valacer* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On the evening of October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made 
landfall in southern New Jersey, with impacts felt across more 
than a dozen states.1  During Sandy’s immediate aftermath, 
more than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary shelters, 
and more than 8.5 million utility customers lost power.2  The 
storm flooded numerous roads and tunnels, blocked 
transportation corridors, and deposited extensive debris along 
the coastline.3  A year later, more than $7.9 billion in National 
Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) payments had been made to 
policy holders.4  In January 2013, Congress passed legislation to 
temporarily increase NFIP’s borrowing authority by $9.7 billion, 
from $20.7 billion to $30.4 billion to address these claims.5  The 
NFIP is in dire financial straits. Hurricane Katrina-related 
claims alone had put the NFIP at an $18 billion deficit.  As of 
July 2013, following payments to policy holders for Hurricane 
Sandy-related claims, the NFIP was $24 billion in debt to the 
United States Treasury.6 
 
*Pace University, J.D.; Fordham University, B.A/M.A.  I would like to thank 
Professor Andrew Lund for his thoughtful feedback and advice on this piece, 
and my mother for her continued support in all I do. 
1. Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, FEMA (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1382967173777-
7411aa1b6d729a8a97e84dbba62083d8/FEMA%20Sandy%20One%20Year%20
Fact%20Sheet_508.pdf. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-283, HIGH-RISK SERIES: AN 
UPDATE (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652133.pdf. 
6. National Flood Insurance Program: Continued Attention Needed to 
1
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As will be seen, an analysis of the history of the NFIP and 
recent litigation surrounding short-lived reforms which sought 
to correct massive deficits in the program shows the political 
volatility of flood insurance in America.  Without actuarial 
principles guiding the program, the program is all but 
guaranteed a bleak fiscal outlook given budgetary and 
environmental concerns. 
This paper is broken down into three parts.  Part I traces 
the history and evolution of flood insurance in the United States, 
including the establishment of federal flood insurance and key 
reforms over the 20th and 21st centuries.  Part II discusses the 
2012 flood insurance reform package, subsequent legal 
challenges to the reforms, and the government’s response to 
political pressure over the reform.  Part III concludes discussing 
the continued need for flood insurance reform, especially in a 
world of rising sea levels and more frequent, stronger weather 
events. 
 
II.      A Brief History of the National Flood Insurance Program 
 
A. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
 
The NFIP was established when Congress passed the 
National Flood Insurance Act (“NFIA”) in 1968.7  The NFIP is a 
federally-subsidized program, part of an effort to create 
affordable flood insurance for those living in flood-prone areas.8  
Congress created this program to remedy the fact that flood 
insurance was not readily available from private insurance 
companies.9  It was the result of decades of failed attempts by 
the United States to physically restrain floodwaters with levees, 
floodways, reservoirs and other physical structures, all at great 
 
Address Challenges Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy of 
the Committee On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) 
(statement of Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and 
Community Investment Team, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657939.pdf. 
7. National Flood Insurance, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title XIII, § 1302, 82. 
Stat. 572 (1968). 
8. Id. 
9. Quyhn T. Pham, The Future of the National Flood Insurance Program 
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 629, 630 (2006). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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expense.10  The impetus to pass the NFIP came in reaction to the 
escalating costs of ad hoc post-disaster relief legislation, 
triggered initially by the Alaska earthquake of 1964, and 
followed by severe flooding and damage from Hurricane Betsy in 
1965, America’s first billion dollar hurricane.11  Additionally, the 
NFIP was implemented in the midst of a remarkable population 
shift to hurricane-vulnerable states and coastal counties.12  For 
example, since 1950, Florida’s astounding 579% growth rate was 
the highest in the nation, raising it from 20th to 4th in 
population.13  The NFIP was a congressional response that 
specifically sought to manage development in floodplains and 
encourage state and local governments to “constrict the 
development of land which is exposed to flood damage.”14  The 
NFIP enables property owners in participating communities to 
purchase insurance as a protection against flood losses in 
exchange for state and community floodplain management 
regulations that reduce future flood damages.15  Participation in 
the NFIP is based on an agreement between communities and 
the federal government.16  Flood insurance is made available 
within a community when it adopts and enforces a floodplain 
management ordinance to reduce future flood risk to new 
construction in floodplains.17  Given the NFIP’s origin and 
mission there was practically a guarantee that politics would 
play a large role in its administration.  Indeed, in the years 
immediately following the creation of the NFIP there was 
pressure to expand coverage directly from real estate and 
construction interests—as well as municipalities looking to 
 
10. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance 
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 64-65 (1985). 
11. Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther, Troubled Waters: 
The National Flood Insurance Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J. POL’Y 
HIST. 327, 327 (2014). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e)(1)-(2) (2012). 
15. THOMAS L. HAYES & SHAMA S. SABADE, FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: ACTUARIAL RATE REVIEW 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1554-20490-
7222/rate_rev04.pdf. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
3
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sustain tax revenues through development.18 
It was a matter of legislative finding that floods lead to 
personal hardships and economic distress which in turn require 
sharing the risk of flood losses through a national program of 
flood insurance.19  Congress also found that “it is in the public 
interest for persons already living in flood-prone areas to have 
both an opportunity to purchase flood insurance and access to 
more adequate limits of coverage, so that they will be 
indemnified, for their losses in the event of future flood 
disasters.”20  The Act originally provided subsidized insurance 
only to properties already existing at the time the area within 
which they were located was identified as a Special Flood 
Hazard Area (“SFHA”).21 
As the Army Corps of Engineers went about its work of 
assessing and mapping hazards in the early days, it might find 
a community to have a greater than 1% chance in any given year 
of a serious flood.22  Communities in these zones were deemed to 
be SFHAs, and this designation placed the community under 
pressure to pass ordinances restricting floodplain development 
or lose NFIP eligibility.23  Faced with restricting development or 
taking chances on a hurricane and hoping for disaster relief 
payments, many communities in the early years of the NFIP 
chose to take their chances.24 
When category five Hurricane Camille hit the Gulf Coast in 
August 1969 (259 killed, $1.4 billion in losses) only two 
communities (Fairbanks, Alaska and Metairie, Louisiana) were 
participating in the NFIP.25  Only two more communities would 
be deemed eligible by the end of 1969.26  This dismal state led 
Congress to amend the program and allow communities that had 
not yet been mapped for flood hazard or had actuarial rates 
 
18. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 11, at 336-37. 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(1)-(4). 
20. Id. § 4002(a)(6). 
21. Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood 
Insurance Program and the “Takings” Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 
336 (1990). 
22. Knowles & Kunreuther, supra note 11, at 336-37. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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computed to join on an “emergency” basis as long they accepted 
floodplain development controls on new construction.27  This so-
called “St. Germain Amendment” lowered the time from 
application to certification from 9-12 months to 3 weeks, and 
brought in 154 new communities (5,500 policies) by mid-1970.28 
 
B. The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 
 
As just shown, a major defect of the original NFIP was its 
failure to associate federal assistance with the purchase of flood 
insurance.29  At the time, the lack of participation by eligible 
homeowners was primarily fueled by their reliance upon federal 
disaster assistance “to finance their recovery.”30  While Congress 
could not force homeowners to purchase flood insurance31 they 
were able to force participation by using spending powers to 
establish federally-backed mortgages.32  The Flood Disaster 
Protection Act of 1973 required federal financial regulatory 
agencies to adopt regulations prohibiting their regulated lending 
institutions from making, increasing, extending or renewing a 
loan secured by improved real estate or a mobile home located 
or to be located in a SFHA in a community participating in the 
NFIP unless property securing the loan was covered by flood 
insurance.33  Flood insurance became mandatory for anyone 
wanting to obtain federally-backed mortgages in high risk flood 
zones.  The Act also made federal financial assistance for 
construction in flood hazard areas contingent upon the purchase 
of flood insurance.34  The Act had the intended effect of 
increasing enrollment in the NFIP and within seven years 
nearly every community with flood hazards agreed to join the 
program.35 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Singer, supra note 21, at 336. 
30. Rachel Lisotta, In Over Our Heads: The Inefficiencies of the National 
Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. 
MAR. L.J. 511, 517 (2012). 
31. Id. at 517. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 515. 
34. Singer, supra note 21, at 337. 
35. Pham, supra note 9, at 632. 
5
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C. Creation of the “Write Your Own” Program 
 
Language in the original 1968 statute provided that the 
national flood insurance program was “to the maximum extent 
practicable,” intended to encourage and arrange for financial 
participation and risk sharing program by insurance companies 
and others. Specifically, the 1968 Act stated: 
 
In administering the flood insurance program 
under this subchapter, the Administrator is 
authorized to enter into any contracts, 
agreements, or other appropriate arrangements 
which may, from time to time, be necessary for the 
purpose of utilizing, on such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed upon, the facilities and services 
of any insurance companies or other insurers, 
insurance agents and brokers, or insurance 
adjustment organizations; and such contracts, 
agreements, or arrangements may include 
provision for payment of applicable operating 
costs and allowances for such facilities and 
services as set forth in the schedules prescribed 
under section 4018 of this title.36 
 
In 1983 Congress took the necessary steps to carry out this 
statutory authority by implementing the “Write Your Own” 
(“WYO”) program through FEMA37 regulations.38  Under WYO, 
private sector insurers market flood insurance with the federal 
government acting as guarantor and reinsurer.39  The WYO 
program is a cooperative undertaking of the insurance industry 
and FEMA.40  It allows participating property and casualty 
 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4018 (2012). 
37. From 1968 until 1979, the NFIP was administered by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development. Beginning in 1979, FEMA assumed 
control.  See AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH ET AL., A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS 
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 28 (2002). 
38. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 62.23-.24 (2009). 
39. Singer, supra note 21, at 337. 
40. What Is the Write Your Own Program?, FEMA, 
http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/what-write-your-own-
program (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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insurance companies to write and service the Standard Flood 
Insurance Policies (“SFIPs”) of the NFIP in their own names.41 
The companies receive an expense allowance for policies written 
and claims processed while the Federal Government retains 
responsibility for underwriting losses.42  The WYO program 
operates as part of the NFIP, and is subject to its rules and 
regulations.43  Insurance agents serve as the agent of record 
between the insured and the NFIP, thus the NFIP does not 
employ agents to broker or to service the flood insurance 
policies.44  Implementation of WYO resulted in a drastic increase 
in the number of NFIP policies.45  From 1985 to 2004, the 
number of NFIP policies rose from 2 million to 4.7 million in 
about 20,000 communities.46 
 
D. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1994 
 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1994 imposed the 
requirement that an institution, or servicer acting on its behalf, 
upon discovering that security property is not covered by an 
adequate amount of flood insurance, must, after providing notice 
and an opportunity for the borrower to obtain the necessary 
amount of flood insurance, purchase flood insurance in the 
appropriate amount on the borrower’s behalf.47  Therefore, even 
those individuals who do not voluntarily purchase flood 
insurance through the NFIP are effectively in the NFIP 
marketplace since their lenders will “force place” the insurance 
and factor the cost of this insurance into the borrower’s monthly 
payments.48  This means that there is no effective “opt out” for 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Lisotta, supra note 30, at 515. 
45. Pham, supra note 9, at 633. 
46. Id. 
47. FDIC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL: FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT V-6.5 (2014), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/pdf/V-6.1.pdf. 
48. There has been recent controversy with banks inflating premiums for 
force-placed insurance.  See David McAfee, Citibank to Pay $110M in Force-
Placed Insurance Settlement, LAW360 (Feb. 5, 2014 8:54 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/507490; Allissa Wickham, Wells Fargo Settles 
Force-Placed Insurance Class Action, LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2014 7:41 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/515666/wells-fargo-settles-force-placed-
7
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those who do not fully own their flood-prone properties.  Indeed, 
the NFIP expressly prohibits federally-regulated lending 
institutions from making real estate loans in special flood 
hazard areas if the property is not covered by a flood insurance 
policy.49  Congress also amended the NFIA to provide that new 
contracts for flood insurance coverage and any modifications to 
coverage under existing contracts would become effective on 
expiration of a 30-day period.50 
Additionally, the 1994 reforms introduced the identifying 
term “repetitive loss structure” and defined it to mean “a 
structure covered by a contract for flood insurance under this 
title that has incurred flood-related damage on two occasions 
during a 10-year period ending on the date of the event for which 
a second claim is made, in which the cost of repair, on the 
average, equaled or exceeded 25% of the value of the structure 
at the time of each such flood event.”51 
 
E. The Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2004 
 
Still, after various forms of financial incentivizing, quasi-
privatization, and outright penalization, many residences in 
floodplains remained uninsured.52  The most important aspect of 
the 2004 Reform Act was the identification of “repetitive-loss 
 
insurance-class-action. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2012). 
50. National Flood Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, Tit. V, §  579, 108 
Stat. 2160 (1993).  Prior to this, the NFIP required only a five-day waiting 
period between the purchase of coverage and its effective date.  See Christine 
A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a 
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1493-94 (2007).  This 
allowed property owners to “track” approaching floodwaters and purchase 
insurance at the last minute.  Id.  In 1993, in Chesterfield, Missouri, owners of 
corporations behind a levee rushed to buy flood insurance just in time to beat 
the five-day waiting period required before being eligible for insurance 
benefits.  Id.  When the levee collapsed, sixty-seven claims were filed in the 
area behind the levee, totaling $13.2 million.  Chesterfield residents received 
a financial windfall in the form of federal insurance payouts.  Id. 
51. § 512(a), 108 Stat. 2160. 
52. Lisotta, supra note 30, at 518 (“[A] study in 2005 indicated [eighty-
four percent] of residents in flood-prone areas had not purchased flood 
insurance—although nearly half were supposed to have purchased it by law.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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properties,” which were defined as “a property that had 
experienced two or more flood losses within a 10-year period 
where each loss exceeded $1,000.”53  These properties were 
wreaking havoc on the NFIP.  Indeed, they comprised only 
approximately 1% of insured properties but were expected to 
account for 25 to 30% of claims losses.54  Therefore, the 2004 
reforms addressed mitigation efforts for homeowners and 
eligible communities in an attempt to stop reoccurring claims for 
the same properties.55  These efforts included buyouts, 
elevations, relocations, or flood-proofing in hopes of producing 
savings for policyholders and taxpayers through reduced losses 
and disaster assistance.56 
Concerns over repetitive-loss properties were answered by 
including a new section to the NFIA entitled “Pilot Program for 
Mitigation of Severe Repetitive Loss Properties.”57  For purposes 
of the new section the concept of a “severe repetitive loss 
property” was defined in the example of “a property consisting 
of one to four residences to mean a property covered under an 
NFIP contract for flood insurance that had incurred flood-
related damage for which four or more separate claims payments 
had been made with the amount of each exceeding $5,000 and 
the cumulative amount of those claims payments exceeding 
$20,000 or for which at least two separate claims payments had 
been made with the cumulative amount exceeding the value of 
the property.”58 
 
F. NFIP Legal Construction 
 
States have traditionally retained many controls over the 
insurance industries operating within their jurisdictions. State 
legislatures set broad policy for the regulation of insurance.59 
 
53. National Flood Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 108-264, §  2(3), 118 Stat. 
712 (2004). 
54. See id. § 2(6); Lisotta, supra note 30, at 519. 
55. Lisotta, supra note 30, at 519 
56. § 2(9), 118 Stat. 712. 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4102a (2012). 
58. § 102(a), 118 Stat. 712. 
59. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’R, STATE INSURANCE REGULATION HISTORY, 
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE (2011), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_reg.pdf. 
9
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They establish and oversee state insurance departments, 
regularly review and revise state insurance laws, and approve 
regulatory budgets.60  States’ tax premiums of commercial 
insurers oversee the financial solvency of insurers, require the 
filing of policy forms with a state insurance regulatory agency, 
and regulate insurance marketing and claims practices.61  Each 
state has a department of insurance and an insurance 
commissioner who is usually a cabinet-level officer responsible 
for overseeing that state’s insurance regulatory operation.62 
 Under the NFIA, however, state insurance law is 
preempted by federal law and FEMA regulations due to the 
federal nature of flood insurance. As the NFIA makes clear: 
 
In the event the program is carried out as 
provided in section 4071 of this title, the 
Administrator shall be authorized to adjust and 
make payment of any claims for proved and 
approved losses covered by flood insurance, and 
upon the disallowance by the Administrator of 
any such claim, or upon the refusal of the claimant 
to accept the amount allowed upon any such 
claim, the claimant, within one year after the date 
of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial 
disallowance by the Administrator, may institute 
an action against the Administrator on such claim 
in the United States district court for the district 
in which the insured property or the major part 
thereof shall have been situated, and original 
exclusive jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon 
such court to hear and determine such action 
without regard to the amount in controversy.63 
 
As the above text shows, Congress conferred exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction over all disputes arising out of the 
NFIP. The courts have widely acknowledged that the NFIA 
 
60. Id. 
61. See id. at 2-5. 
62. See Map of NAIC States & Jurisdictions, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
http://www.naic.org/state_web_map.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (2012). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
  
1060 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:3 
authorized FEMA to promulgate regulations to preempt state 
law claims made against issues related to the NFIP.64 
Additionally, courts have interpreted this preemption broadly, 
placing limited ability on a party to sue FEMA for disputes 
arising out of NFIP claims handling.65  Courts have also held 
that the NFIA creates no private cause of action.66  Courts have 
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 4072 as a limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity to be construed narrowly.67 
 
 
 
64. See Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(“[S]tate law tort claims arising from claims handling by a WYO are preempted 
by federal law.”); Davis v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 
1248 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that that federal law preempts state law, not 
only with respect to policy interpretation and claims handling under the NFIP, 
but also with respect to policy issuance and administration, including the 
rating, renewal, transfer, non-renewal, cancellation, or reformation of any 
SFIP contract issued by a WYO Company on behalf of the NFIP); TAF, LLC v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 (D. Colo. 2008) (holding that 
bad faith breach claims are  state law tort claims based on the handling of the 
claim, and therefore preempted by NFIA); Scritchfield v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 675, 680 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (determining that FEMA 
effectively preempted all state law claims by revising the language of the 
SFIP); Pecarovich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 981, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(stating that “an express preemption provision” has been added to policies 
under the NFIP), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Fed. Appx. 23, 26 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Friedman v. S.C. Ins. Co., 855 F. Supp. 348, 350 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that 
Federal common and statutory law preempts state contract law for purpose of 
interpretation of insurance policies issued pursuant to National Flood 
Insurance Act). 
65. See Gunter v. Farmers Ins. Co., 736 F.3d 768, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the reference to federal common law in insureds’ SFIP only 
required courts to look to standard principles of interpreting insurance 
contracts when resolving questions about coverage, not to expand available 
remedies or causes of action); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390, 398 
(5th Cir. 2007) (Wright II ) (holding that plaintiff's “extra-contractual claims 
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation are neither explicitly nor implicitly 
authorized by the NFIA” and therefore dismissing federal common law claims); 
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (E.D. La. 
2008) (concluding that the insureds' extra-contractual claim alleging breach of 
fiduciary duty against the WYO insurer based on the calculation of SFIP rates 
was preempted by NFIA and therefore dismissed). 
66. Segall v. Rapkin, 875 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
67. State Bank of Coloma v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, 851 F.2d 817, 820 
(6th Cir. 1988) (“Congress, in creating the National Flood Insurance Program, 
provided that claimants under the program could sue the government in 
District Court.  As we noted, such waivers of sovereign immunity must be 
strictly construed.”). 
11
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III.      The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform and 
Modernization Act of 2012 
 
A. The Bigger-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 
 
On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed the Biggert-
Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (“BW-12”) extending 
the National Flood Insurance Program through September 30, 
2017.68  BW-12 also made significant reforms including phasing 
out subsidies for many properties, raising the cap on annual 
premium increases from 10% to 20%, allowing multifamily 
properties to purchase NFIP policies, imposing minimum 
deductibles for flood claims, requiring the NFIP administrator 
to develop a plan for repaying the debt incurred from Hurricane 
Katrina, and establishing a technical mapping advisory council 
to deal with map modernization issues.69 
BW-12 began the elimination of five categories of property 
to be excluded from receiving subsidized premium rates: (1) 
residential property that is not the primary residence of an 
individual; (2) any “severe repetitive loss” property; (3) property 
that has incurred flood-related damage in which the cumulative 
amounts of payments equaled or exceeded the fair market value 
of that property; (4) business property; and, (5) any property that 
on or after July 6, 2012, the date of enactment, has experienced 
or sustained substantial damage exceeding 50% of its fair 
market value or substantial improvement exceeding 30% of the 
fair market value.70  Subsidies would be immediately phased out 
for all new and lapsed policies and upon sale of the property.71 
Additionally, new rules were established to make it easier to 
apply for the FEMA buyout program.72  BW-12 also capped 
 
68. Lori Widmer, What to Know About the New Flood Insurance Program, 
INS. J. (July, 31, 2012), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/07/31/257675.htm. 
69. Andrew G. Simpson, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Reform 
Bill, INS. J. (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/07/09/254797.htm. 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2) (2012). 
71. See FEMA, QUESTIONS ABOUT THE BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE 
REFORM ACT OF 2012 2 (2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1912-25045-9380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf. 
72. Widmer, supra note 68. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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annual premium increases at 20%, a 10% raise over the previous 
year’s cap.73 
Changes were also made to WYO.  Under BW-12, 
underwriters would receive an expense allowance equal to 30% 
of premium.74  Agents would receive 15% commission, and the 
NFIP picks up 13% of company expenses and 2% of state 
premium tax.75  However, despite the desire of NFIP to transfer 
some of the business to the private market, private insurers are 
beginning to leave the NFIP’s WYO program.76  Some insurers 
began jumping ship after 2008, when those 17 extensions of the 
law and lack of any real change discouraged them.77  Most 
notably, State Farm dropped its participation in the program, at 
which time it was administering 829,273 policies.78  At the time, 
the company cited extensions and expirations, as well as 
procedural changes that forced too much of its resources to the 
program as reasons for ending their participation in WYO.79 
As noted above, BW-12 also reestablished the Technical 
Mapping Advisory Council to make recommendations to FEMA 
about how to update and improve Flood Insurance Rate Maps 
(“FIRMs”).80  Additionally, BW-12 required FEMA, in 
coordination with the Technical Mapping Advisory Council, to 
create a program to constantly review, update, and maintain 
NFIP rate maps.81  BW-12 ordered that when the flood maps 
change, any property located in an area that is participating in 
the NFIP will have the risk premium rate adjusted to accurately 
reflect the current risk of flood to that property.82 
BW-12 also required that the NFIP devise a schedule for 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id.  Recently, Traveler’s Insurance announced they would also be 
ending their involvement in WYO.  See Travelers to Exit NFIP’s Write-Your-
Own Program, INS. J. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/08/23/302727.htm. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4101a (2012). 
81. Id. § 4101b(a). 
82. Id. § 4015(h). 
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repayment of the program’s debts83 and establishment of a 
reserve fund.84  The reforms set forth in the new plan had the 
Congressional Budget Office estimate a $2.7 billion increase in 
net income over the next ten years.85  Still, Congress expected a 
more aggressive plan for paying off the $18 billion still owed.86 
The National Flood Insurance Reserve Fund was to be separated 
from other accounts or funds and be available to meet future 
obligations of the program including payment of claims, claims 
adjustment expenses, and repayment of debt.87  A balance that 
is equal to at least 1% of the total potential loss exposure of all 
outstanding policies in force in the prior fiscal year is required 
to be maintained by the reserve fund.88 
 
B. Mississippi’s Lawsuit 
 
Almost immediately the reforms were met with popular 
disapproval.  On October 1, 2013, FEMA began implementing 
rate changes on policyholders whereby some individuals saw 
flood insurance premiums increases more than ten-fold.89  States 
and their elected officials began scrambling to stave off full rate 
increases prior to their October 1, 2013 implementation.  On 
September 26, 2013, the Mississippi Department of Insurance 
filed a lawsuit against the federal government to try to block 
rates from increasing on October 1 in the NFIP.90 
What drove Mississippi’s Department of Insurance to sue 
before any other state was that BW-12 implemented a strategy 
for remapping the country’s flood zones, and that remapping 
 
83. Id. § 4016(c). 
84. Id. § 4017a. 
85. Widmer, supra note 68. 
86. Id. 
87. 42 U.S.C. §  4017a(a). 
88. Id. § 4017a(b)(1). 
89. See Lizette Alvarez & Campbell Robertson, Cost of Flood Insurance 
Rises, Along with Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A14 (“Wendy Lockhart 
and her husband, who live in St. Pete Beach [Florida], a barrier island, said 
they recently closed on a house not too far away. Just after they put their old 
house on the market, they found out that for a buyer, the flood insurance rates 
on that home would jump immediately to $8,500 a year from $800.”). 
90. Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Insurance Chief Sues to Halt Flood 
Insurance Rate Hikes, INS. J. (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2013/09/29/306567.htm. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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appeared to have started with Mississippi.91  According to 
FEMA, Mississippi and Louisiana were the first states to include 
the post-Hurricane Katrina statistics in their rating 
methodology.92  This meant that Mississippi’s citizens would pay 
higher rates for many years before citizens of other states would 
have been required to do likewise.93  However, Florida94, 
Alabama95, Louisiana96, South Carolina97, and Massachusetts98 
all filed amicus curiae briefs supporting Mississippi’s lawsuit. 
Mississippi claimed that FEMA’s implementation of the 
scheduled rate increases would be arbitrary and capricious 
because FEMA had failed to conduct and complete various 
studies as statutorily mandated by Congress in BW-12 prior to 
making decisions determining flood insurance premium rate 
changes.99  Among the most important studies for the purposes 
of Mississippi’s argument was an “Affordability Study” which 
read: 
 
(a) FEMA Study.—The Administrator shall 
conduct a study of— 
. . . 
 
91. First Amended Complaint, at 8, Miss. Ins. Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:13CV379 LG-JMR (S.D. Miss. Closed Apr. 14, 2014). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 9. 
94. Florida, Alabama Officials Back Mississippi’s Suit Over Flood 
Insurance, INS. J. (NOV. 15, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2013/11/15/311397.htm. 
95. Id. 
96. Chevel Johnson, Louisiana Joins Lawsuit to Block Flood Insurance 
Hike, INS. J. (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2013/12/02/312712.htm. 
97. Tyrone Richardson, South Carolina Supports Mississippi’s Lawsuit 
Against Flood Insurance Rate Increases, POST & COURIER (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20131108/PC05/131109423. 
98. Mass. AG Files Federal Brief Urging Court Action on Flood Insurance, 
INS. J. (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2013/11/18/311563.htm. 
99. First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at 10-15, 20-23.  Studies to 
be conducted included: (1) Report on Improving the NFIP; (2) Report of the 
Administrator on Activities Under the NFIP; (3) GAO Study on Pre-FIRM 
Structures; (4) GAO Review of FEMA Contractors; (5) Study and Report on 
Graduated Risk; (6) Interagency Coordination Study; (7) GAO Study on 
Business Interruption and Additional Living Expenses Coverages; and (8) 
Report on Inclusion of Building Codes in Floodplain Management Criteria.  Id. 
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(3) methods for establishing an affordability 
framework for the National Flood Insurance 
Program, including methods to aid individuals to 
afford risk-based premiums under the National 
Flood Insurance Program through targeted 
assistance rather than generally subsidized rates, 
including means-tested vouchers; (emphasis 
added) and 
(4) the implications for the National Flood 
Insurance Program and the Federal budget of 
using each such method. 
. . . 
(c) Report.—Not later than 270 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall 
submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives a report that contains the results 
of the study and analysis under this section. 
 
(d) Funding.—Notwithstanding section 1310 of 
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 
U.S.C. 4017), there shall be available to the 
Administrator from the National Flood Insurance 
Fund, of amounts not otherwise obligated, not 
more than $ 750,000 to carry out this section.100 
 
Mississippi argued that since the over-arching purpose of 
the NFIP is to provide affordable flood insurance in high-risk 
areas,101 FEMA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious because 
FEMA was proceeding without considering much of the relevant 
necessary evidence which Congress had expressly identified and 
directed FEMA and the Comptroller of the Currency and others 
to furnish to Congress sufficiently in advance of October 1, 2013 
to make necessary changes and corrections to BW-12.102 
 
100. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957 (2012). 
101. First Amended Complaint, supra note 91, at 9-10. 
102. Id. at 24. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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Mississippi sought declaratory judgment stating that FEMA did 
not yet have the information that was required in order to make 
rating decisions and would not have such information until the 
mandated studies (including those addressing the key issue of 
“affordability”) are obtained and meaningfully reviewed by 
FEMA, that the rate changes are not on “reasonable terms” and 
therefore, contrary to the congressionally-stated intent behind 
the NFIP, and that FEMA could not move forward until the 
mandated studies were completed.103  Mississippi also sought 
injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”) on the basis that FEMA’s failure to complete the 
mandatory obligations imposed during the first year after the 
passage of BW-12 were multiple, discrete agency inactions or 
failures to act which mandate a judicial decree under the APA 
requiring FEMA to deliver the required reports to Congress and 
enter into the various contracts and consulting relationships 
with third parties all before any rate increases are 
implemented.104  Mississippi’s entire argument for the studies 
being mandatory hinged upon the use of the word “shall” in the 
statutory language of BW-12.105 
 
C. Analysis and FEMA’s Response 
 
FEMA filed a motion to dismiss responding that Congress 
never intended the studies to be completed before 
implementation of rate changes.106  The Supreme Court has 
ruled that agencies are given broad discretion in determining 
whether or not to act in certain instances.  In Heckler v. Chaney, 
prison inmates in California brought suit to compel the FDA to 
 
103. Id. at 26. 
104. Id. at 31. 
105. Id. at 34 (“The other provisions of BW-12 cited and discussed 
previously all contain ‘shall’ as mandatory language which FEMA has not 
complied with.”) (emphasis added). 
106. Brief for Defendant, at 11, Miss. Ins. Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., No. 1:13CV379 LG-JMR (S.D. Miss. Closed Apr. 14, 2014) (“[T]o complete 
the affordability study required by Section 236 will do nothing to redress the 
injuries Plaintiff alleges Mississippi residents are suffering. . . . This is because 
the plain language of subsections 205(e), 205(a)(1)(B) (42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)-
(2)), and 205(a)(2) explicitly mandate when the premiums must be phased out 
or eliminated, without regard to any other action that BW-12 directs FEMA to 
undertake.”) (citations omitted). 
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take enforcement action under a law with respect to drugs used 
for lethal injections to carry out capital punishment.107  The 
Supreme Court in Heckler held that the presumption of 
unreviewability of decisions of an agency not to undertake 
enforcement action was not overcome by the prison inmates.108  
In Heckler, the Supreme Court noted that there is a presumption 
that an agency’s refusal to investigate or enforce is within the 
agency’s discretion, unless Congress has indicated otherwise.109 
This presumption of agency discretion can be overcome if 
Congress indicates that a decision or act is not discretionary.110 
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler applies to 
both agency matters of enforcement and investigation.111  When 
discussing why agency determinations should not normally be 
reviewed the Supreme Court said: 
 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves 
a complicated balancing of a number of factors 
which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, 
the agency must not only assess whether a 
violation has occurred, but whether agency 
resources are best spent on this violation or 
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if 
it acts, whether the particular enforcement action 
requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, 
and, indeed, whether the agency has enough 
resources to undertake the action at all. An 
agency generally cannot act against each 
technical violation of the statute it is charged with 
enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than 
the courts to deal with the many variables 
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. 
Similar concerns animate the principles of 
 
107. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
108. Id. at 838. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. (“The general exception to reviewability provided by § 701(a)(2) 
for action ‘committed to agency discretion’ remains a narrow one, . . . but within 
that exception are included agency refusals to institute investigative or 
enforcement proceedings, unless Congress has indicated otherwise.”) (citations 
omitted). 
111. Id. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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administrative law that courts generally will 
defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it 
is charged with implementing, and to the 
procedures it adopts for implementing that 
statute.112 
 
The courts have also had occasion to discuss whether the 
use of the word “shall” creates an affirmative duty on behalf of 
agencies to carry out statutorily prescribed actions.  In Sierra 
Club v. Whitman, the EPA was sued by citizens and the Sierra 
Club alleging that EPA failed to take action upon alleged Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) violations by operators of a wastewater 
treatment plant.113  The CWA provides that, whenever “the 
Administrator finds that any person is in violation” of permit 
conditions, the Administrator “shall issue an order requiring 
such person to comply . . . or . . . shall bring a civil action” against 
the violator.114  Much the same as Mississippi’s argument 
against FEMA, the Sierra Club relied heavily on the use of the 
word “shall” in the CWA as forming the basis for mandatory 
agency action.115 
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Sierra Club’s 
contention that the presence of “shall” in the CWA created a 
mandatory duty for EPA to investigate or take enforcement 
action.116  The Court began by recognizing that “shall” in a 
statute generally denotes a mandatory duty.117  However, the 
use of “shall” is not conclusive.118  Particularly when used in a 
statute that prospectively affects government action, “shall” is 
sometimes the equivalent of “may.”119  The question whether 
“shall” commands or merely authorizes is determined by the 
objectives of the statute.120 
 
112. Id. at 831-32. 
113. Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001). 
114. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (2012)). 
115. Id. at 904 (“It is this language, and especially the word ‘shall,’ upon 
which the Sierra Club principally relies.”). 
116. Id. at 903-04. 
117. Id. (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)). 
118. Id. at 904 (citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)). 
119. Id. (citing Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 534 
(1930)). 
120. Id. (citing Escoe, 95 U.S. at 493). 
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The objective of BW-12 was to bring the NFIP back to 
financial solvency by employing actuarial principles in 
determining flood insurance rates.  This is evident through the 
removal of subsidies as outlined above.  While Congress put 
certain, varying deadlines in place for FEMA to complete a wide 
array of studies, it could not be said that Congress required 
FEMA to base any rate changes upon the findings of those 
studies.  Specifically, the text of BW-12 related to the 
Affordability Study (reproduced above) says nothing that 
requires FEMA to tie any findings from the study to any new 
flood insurance rates that are meant to reflect actuarial risk. 
BW-12 merely says: 
 
Not later than 270 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall 
submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives a report that contains the results 
of the study and analysis under this section.121 
 
Clearly absent from this section was any indication that 
Congress intended to require FEMA to incorporate into its 
analysis the results of this study (or any other study) in 
determining new flood insurance premium rates which were 
primarily meant to show actuarial risk of flooding. All the 
statute said regarding the study was that it was to be delivered 
to certain congressional and Senate committees.  Viewing 
Mississippi’s claim under the Chaney framework and the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in Sierra Club v. Whitman it is obvious that 
FEMA would be accorded deference in determining the rate 
changes before the studies were completed. 
In Guerrero v. Clinton the Governments of the Territory of 
Guam, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and 
State of Hawaii brought suit challenging the failure of the 
Director of Office of Insular Affairs to issue a report to Congress 
annually as required by the Compact of Free Association Act of 
 
121. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
141, § 100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957 (2012). 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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1985.122  In ruling that the report did not need to be completed 
and transmitted to Congress, the Ninth Circuit in Guerrero said: 
 
Submitting a § 1904(e)(2) report does not cause 
Congress to “act sympathetically,” nor is it in any 
way the sine quo non to receiving Compact aid. 
Instead, it is purely informational. Although a 
more detailed report or a report that highlights 
impact more emphatically might have a better 
chance of getting some member of Congress’s 
attention, it carries no greater clout than that. . . 
In sum, no legal consequences flow from a § 
1904(e)(2) report and it has no “determinative or 
coercive effect upon the action of someone else”123 
 
In the Mississippi lawsuit, FEMA argued that the reports were 
meant to be only informational in nature. In requiring FEMA to 
only deliver the studies to Congress it could not be logically 
concluded that Congress intended FEMA to base any rate 
changes off the conclusions of those studies.124 
An additional argument that FEMA advanced in its brief in 
support of its motion to dismiss was that the Mississippi 
Department of Insurance lacked standing to sue FEMA for the 
rate changes. FEMA argued that Supreme Court precedent 
 
122. Guerrero v. Clinton, 157 F.3d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998). 
123. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)). 
124. It should be noted that FEMA attempted to complete the study in the 
timeframe laid out in BW-12. As FEMA noted in their brief:  
 
In February 2013, FEMA began discussions with NAS 
[National Academy of Science] and others regarding the 
requirements for the affordability study. . . . All parties 
concluded that additional time and funding were needed to 
complete the full scope of work contemplated in Section 236. 
. . . On April 18, 2013, FEMA received a letter from NAS 
explaining that NAS could not complete its analysis under 
the time and funding constraints provided for in BW-12. . . . 
After receiving the letter from NAS in April of 2013, FEMA 
formally notified Congress of the delays, as well as funding 
constraints, in completing the affordability study.  
 
Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 8-9 (citations omitted). 
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forecloses a State agency from suing the federal government on 
behalf of the State’s citizens to protect those citizens from the 
operation of federal law.125  Therefore, argued FEMA, any 
attempt to rely on the injuries of Mississippi citizens and thereby 
characterize this action as one in parens patriae126 had to be 
rejected.127 
FEMA argued that the Supreme Court had made clear that 
a State cannot bring a parens patriae action against federal 
defendants to protect a state’s citizens from the operation of 
federal statutes.128  In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Supreme 
Court stressed that “it is no part of [a state’s] duty or power to 
enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the 
federal government;” “it is the United States, and not the state, 
which represents [its citizens] as parens patriae.”129 
However, the Supreme Court has also established the right 
of a State to sue as parens patriae to prevent or repair harm to 
its “quasi-sovereign” interests.130  These interests deal primarily 
with original suits brought directly in the Supreme Court 
pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution under 
common-law rights of action.131  The key characteristic in these 
suits are that they are lawsuits between states or between states 
and private entities.132  In order to properly invoke this 
 
125. Id. at 15 
126. The doctrine of parens patriae (literally meaning “parent of his 
country”) says a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of 
a citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to 
prosecute the suit.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
127. Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 15. 
128. Id. at 11 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 
(1923)). 
129. Id. 
130. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). 
131. Id. at 258-59. 
132. The Court in Standard Oil noted: 
 
This Court's acceptance of the notion of parens patriae suits 
in Louisiana v. Texas was followed in a series of cases: 
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (holding that 
Missouri was permitted to sue Illinois and a Chicago 
sanitation district on behalf of Missouri citizens to enjoin the 
discharge of sewage into the Mississippi River); Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (holding that Kansas was 
permitted to sue as parens patriae to enjoin the diversion of 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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jurisdiction, the State must bring an action on its own behalf and 
not on behalf of particular citizens.133 
The Supreme Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico, ex rel., Barez also explained that there are no “definitive 
limits on the proportion of the population of the State that must 
be adversely affected by the challenged behavior” in order to 
support a parens patriae action; rather such a determination 
turns on whether a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the 
State’s] population” is affected by the direct and indirect effects 
of the alleged injury.134  Additionally, after admitting that this 
term “quasi-sovereign” is vague, the Supreme Court in Snapp 
wrote that “a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health 
and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents in 
general.”135 
The question in the FEMA lawsuit was if those citizens of 
Mississippi, and only those citizens, who were to be negatively 
impacted by changes in NFIP flood insurance rates rose to the 
level of a “sufficiently substantial segment of [the State’s] 
population” as identified in Snapp.  After all, in Mississippi, 14% 
of flood insurance policies are subsidized, according to the 
NFIP.136  Both residents of Mississippi who do not partake in the 
NFIP and 86% of flood insurance policyholders would go 
 
water from an interstate stream); Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (holding that Georgia was 
entitled to sue to enjoin fumes from a copper plant across the 
state border from injuring land in five Georgia counties); 
People of State of New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 
(1921) (holding that New York could sue to enjoin the 
discharge of sewage into the New York harbor); Pennsylvania 
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (holding that 
Pennsylvania might sue to enjoin restraints on the 
commercial flow of natural gas); and North Dakota v. 
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (holding that Minnesota 
could sue to enjoin changes in drainage which increase the 
flow of water in an interstate stream). 
 
Id. at 258. 
133. Id. at 258 n.12. 
134. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
607 (1982). 
135. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 426 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607). 
136. Pettus, supra note 90. 
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unaffected by any rate changes.  Therefore, assuming arguendo, 
that Mississippi would be permitted to sue the federal 
government for its citizens, the question became if Mississippi’s 
lawsuit violated a basic tenant of the parens patriae doctrine 
because the state’s legal action was on behalf of a particular, 
subset of citizens.  Namely, the 14% of flood insurance 
policyholders having subsidized NFIP policies.  An additional 
question that had to be considered was if protecting cheap, 
subsidized flood insurance for 14% of flood insurance 
policyholder in Mississippi qualified as a quasi-sovereign 
interest in the health and well-being of Mississippi’s residents 
in general. 
Lastly, as FEMA argued, Mississippi could not demonstrate 
that it had standing to challenge BW-12 because it has failed to 
identify an injury it had suffered from the statute.137  As the 
Supreme Court noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: 
 
Over the years, our cases have established that 
the irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing contains three elements. First, the 
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or 
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ 
Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained 
of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . 
. th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court.” Third, it must be 
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that 
the injury will be “redressed by a favorable 
decision.” 138 
 
The only allegations of injury found in Mississippi’s 
Amended Complaint were allegations of injury to Mississippi 
 
137. Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 10. 
138. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (citations 
omitted). 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
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NFIP policyholders.139  Taken together, FEMA claimed, it was 
obvious that Mississippi lacked the standing to bring the lawsuit 
and even if they had been able to show an injury or bring a 
legitimate claim under parens patriae it is evident that, given 
the statutory construct of BW-12 and case law, FEMA was not 
required to complete the affordability study prior to instituting 
any rate changes. 
 
D. Politics as Usual 
 
The Court did not have an opportunity to rule in this 
critically important case. Rather, in a crass display of election-
year politicking, Congress passed, and President Obama signed 
into law, the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 
2014 on March 21, 2014.140  The President’s signature 
culminated a nearly two-year effort to combat large premium 
increases for some of the 5.5 million flood insurance 
policyholders.141  The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability 
Act limits yearly premium increases to an average of 15% per 
year for each of the nine property categories listed by FEMA, 
and stipulates that no individual policyholder pay an increase of 
more than 18% per year.142  It calls on FEMA to “strive” to reach 
the goal that most policyholders have a premium of no more than 
1% of the value of their coverage—in other words, $2,000 for a 
$200,000 policy.143 
The legislation offers its greatest relief to owners of 
properties that were originally built to code but subsequently 
were found to be at greater flood risk.144  Such “grandfathered” 
homeowners currently benefit from below-market rates that are 
subsidized by other policyholders, and the new legislation 
 
139. Brief for Defendant, supra note 106, at 11. 
140. Bruce Alpert, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Bill into Law, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/03/do_not_run_president_obama_
sig.html. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Nedra Pickler, President Obama Signs Flood Insurance Relief Bill, 
INS. J. (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/03/24/324217.htm. 
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preserves that status and caps premium increases at 18% a 
year.145  Another provision, eagerly sought by the real estate 
industry, allows sellers of older homes built before original flood 
insurance risk maps were drafted to pass taxpayer-subsidized 
policies on to the people buying their homes instead of requiring 
purchasers to pay actuarially sound rates immediately, as 
required by the 2012 law.146 
As a result of the legislation, the Mississippi Department of 
Insurance entered a voluntary notice of dismissal without 
prejudice on April 14, 2014.147  However, Insurance 
Commissioner Chaney said he would refile the lawsuit against 
FEMA if the latest changes in the flood program prove to be 
unsatisfactory.148  FEMA will therefore implement the new 2014 
legislation knowing that elected officials and policyholders in 
flood-prone States are watching closely. 
It is no wonder the timing of the reform bill, passed just 
weeks before Congress was set to begin a two-week spring recess 
and a month-long summer recess later in August.149  The reform 
bill passed by wide margins with support coming from both 
parties.  The bill passed the House of Representatives on March 
4, 2014 with 306 yeas, 91 nays, and 33 not voting.150  Of the yeas, 
126 were Republicans and 180 were Democrats.151  On March 13, 
2014 the bill passed the United States Senate with 72 yeas, 22 
nays, and 6 not voting.152  On the Senate side, the yeas were 
 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Michael Adams, Mississippi Withdrawing Lawsuit Over Flood 
Insurance Rates, INS. J. (Apr. 17, 2014), 
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comprised of 51 Democrats and 21 Republicans.153  The bi-
partisan support for the bill shows just how volatile an issue 
flood insurance reform is in the 2014 midterm election cycle.  
The issue undoubtedly cuts across party lines and ideology.154 
 
IV. Weaker Than the Shore 
 
The Mississippi lawsuit, which as of this writing has been 
terminated, was an opportunity snatched away from the courts 
to come down on the side of the reasoned decision-making of 
FEMA to allow the NFIP to bring itself back to fiscal sanity. 
However, even though the reforms of 2014 rolled back 
significant portions of BW-12, FEMA is still granted authority 
to raise rates as high as 18% a year.  But if the court in the 
Mississippi lawsuit had been given the opportunity to grant 
FEMA’s motion to dismiss there would have been a clear 
opportunity for FEMA to put the NFIP on the road to solvency 
using a broader range of tools to implement rate changes, revise 
flood maps, and remove subsidies that reflect actuarial risks for 
properties in floodplains across America.  However, election year 
politics proved too strong a factor. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
While the increased rates were politically unpopular, the 
NFIP is currently running at a $25 billion deficit.155  The next 
major storm will assuredly put it deeper into debt.  The NFIP 
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will never be solvent without serious changes.  One scientific 
organization has noted that rising sea levels have contributed to 
shoreline erosion and degradation and raises flooding risks from 
extra-high tides.156  States with large areas of low-lying land 
(such as California, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina) or states with large populations living on low-
lying land (such as California, Florida, Louisiana, and New 
York) are particularly vulnerable.157  A rise of approximately two 
feet above today’s sea level by 2100 would put more than $1 
trillion of property and structures in the United States at risk of 
inundation, with roughly half of that value concentrated in 
Florida.158 
Not only will things not get better for the NFIP, they will 
get substantially worse.  The growing pace of coastal 
development puts more people and property in the path of 
coastal storms, flooding, inundation, and erosion.159  Rising 
property values in many places along ocean coastlines also mean 
that, in the event of devastating storms, damage costs are 
growing.160  More and more people moving into coastal areas and 
seeking to purchase flood insurance at below-market rates with 
increasing probabilities of flooding due to rising sea levels and 
stronger weather events is a recipe for disaster for the NFIP.  It 
almost guarantees the NFIP will forever be a budgetary black 
hole of the United States.  Although FEMA is in the process of 
updating FIRMs, FIRMs in some communities flood maps are 
still out of date and have not been updated, in some cases, since 
the 1980’s.161  Mapping practices also do not account for 
 
156. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING 
FLOOD INSURANCE IN A WORLD OF RISING SEAS 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_war
ming/Overwhelming-Risk-Full-Report.pdf. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 4. 
160. Id. 
161. JESSICA GRANNIS, GEO. CLIMATE CENTER, ANALYSIS OF HOW THE 
FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (H.R. 4348) MAY AFFECT STATE AND 
LOCAL ADAPTATION EFFORTS 5 (2012), available at 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinical-
programs/our- 
clinics/HIP/upload/GCC_Analysis-of-the-Flood-Insurance-Reform-Act-of-
2012_8-14-12.pdf. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/7
  
1078 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:3 
increased flood risks as a result climate change, sea-level rise, or 
even increased impervious coverage due to land use changes.162 
As a result, FIRMs may be inaccurate at predicting both the 
geographic extent of flooding and flood heights communities will 
face in the future.163  Indeed, after Hurricane Katrina, it was 
discovered that large portion of the Biloxi, Mississippi area was 
not considered to be, according to 1981 maps, in a special hazard 
zone.164  After the maps were updated, several excluded 
properties were then placed in the special hazard zone.165 
There have been some changes without the needed reforms 
to the NFIP, such as President Barack Obama issuing an 
executive order directing all government agencies handing out 
federal aid to incorporate stricter building requirements that 
take sea-level rise into account.166  Additionally, on the New 
Jersey Shore, any home in a flood zone that was declared 
substantially damaged — meaning it would cost 50% or more of 
the home’s pre-damage market value to restore — must be 
rebuilt to current standards, which may require elevating the 
property.167 
However, these directives and regulations are not enough. 
The ability to increase rates, albeit capped, and the reworking of 
flood maps is an opportunity for our coastal communities to take 
real ownership over the problem of increasing effects of flooding 
and have an honest conversation on this issue.  Implementing 
actuarial principles in the NFIP will incentivize coastal 
communities to construct more wisely and take larger 
preventive measures to combat flooding.  Presently, artificially 
low flood insurance rates have created a vicious cycle of risky 
development near land’s end.  Implementing actuarial principles 
meaningfully in the NFIP’s determination of flood insurance 
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rates and revising flood maps to reflect current sea-levels and 
weather conditions will not only bring the NFIP back from fiscal 
disaster, it will also allow our coastal communities to work 
together with their local, state, and federal governments in 
devising real ways to combat rising sea-levels and harsh 
weather events through mitigation and prevention. 
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